



Strategy and Propaganda:  





 Among the dramatic events that marked the start of the First World War, British 
political and military decisions and actions are particularly well documented and researched. 
These well-known events include the complex political balancing act conducted by Prime 
Minister Herbert Asquith in the crisis of July-August 1914, in his successful attempt to 
minimise resignations from his Cabinet and revolts within his Liberal Party, and to lead both 
Parliament and the country united into the war. They also include the creation before the war 
and the deployment in August 1914 of the British Army’s Expeditionary Force (re-designated 
the British Expeditionary Force or BEF before the end of the month, which is how it is 
usually known), and the confirmation of Field Marshal Sir John French as its Commander-in-
Chief. Equally well-known is the appointment of Field Marshal Earl Kitchener to the post of 
Secretary of State for War on 5 August, his call for volunteers to create a new mass British 
Army, and the unexpectedly large popular response. Yet another well-known story is the 
BEF’s first battles at Mons and le Cateau, the successful retreat from Mons, and the decision 
to turn the BEF to participate in the decisive Battle of the Marne in September. Most 
accounts that follow the British military story that far (and many do not, preferring to stop 
with the first declarations for war), also acknowledge the importance of the Amiens Dispatch 
(sometimes called the Mons Dispatch), a sensational account of the battles of Mons and le 
Cateau published in a special Sunday edition of The Times newspaper on 30 August, which 
also features in most accounts of British propaganda in the war, and of the British Home 
Front. It is often stated as fact both that Kitchener’s personal call to arms was the principal 
motivator of British military volunteerism in 1914 (often if incorrectly called ‘the rush to the 
colours’), and that it was Kitchener’s personal animosity towards war reporters that largely 
determined British policy towards the national press’s reporting of the BEF’s actions in this 
period. It is the purpose of this present account to assemble a narrative chronology of these 
events, so revealing the critical interaction between politics and strategy, military operations 
and battles, social and cultural responses at home including volunteerism, and both the nature 
and apparatus of British propaganda. 
The first formal War Office recommendations regarding the press accompanying a 
British army in wartime date from 1878, while the first regulations for accreditation of 
newspapermen to accompany a British army in wartime were established in 1889.
1
 Like all 
subsequent British government regulations, these were based on negotiated agreements with 
the influential London press rather than on dictated control or censorship. The first large-
scale British experience of the problems with such agreements came in the Anglo-Boer War 
1899-1902. In what would be a reoccurring theme of British propaganda up to the present 
day, an agreement reached between the government and the media in peacetime only through 
compromises, with both sides making their own interpretations of what had been agreed, 
broke down rapidly under the immediate pressures of war. Kitchener as Commander-in-Chief 
in South Africa for the later part of the Anglo-Boer War was particularly hostile to what he 
saw as adverse press reporting. In July 1901 he had mused to the sympathetic Howell A. 
‘Taffy’ Gwynn, then of Reuters news agency, about one day appointing a solitary official 






Kitchener played no part in the subsequent development of British government ideas 
on how to control the press in war-time, which were first prompted by the Russo-Japanese 
War 1904-5. The chief concerns came from the Royal Navy rather than the British Army, and 
arose in consequence of newspapers reporting the deployment of British warships following 
the Dogger Bank incident. From 1905 onwards the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) 
attempted intermittently to draft legislation ‘for the control of the publication of naval and 
military information in cases of emergency’ (meaning war), and canvassed the views of 
numerous national and provincial newspaper editors.
3
 In March 1910, the CID formed a 
‘standing sub-committee regarding press and postal censorship in time of war’, initially 
chaired by Winston Churchill as Home Secretary, which liaised with government 
departments including the Admiralty and War Office on planned wartime procedures, and 
which also considered the possibility of setting up an official Press Bureau in peacetime.
4
 The 
result of these deliberations was that, as on previous occasions before the Anglo-Boer War, 
the government found that it was both impractical and politically unachievable to establish in 
peacetime any legislation and institutions to regulate the press in a future war. Instead, in 
August 1912 the Admiralty and War Office formed the ‘Standing Committee of Official and 
Press Representatives to deal with the publication of Naval and Military News in times of 
emergency’, a decision once more largely prompted by Admiralty concerns over newspapers 
reporting movements of the fleet, in this case during the 1911 Moroccan Crisis, coupled with 
government uncertainty and reluctance to use the powers of the new 1911 Official Secrets 
Act directly against the press.
5
 Shortening its name first to the ‘Joint Standing Committee of 
Admiralty, War Office and Press Representatives’, and later to the ‘Admiralty, War Office 
and Press Committee’, the resulting committee met regularly from October 1912 onwards, 
with a core membership consisting of Sir Graham Greene the permanent secretary for the 
Admiralty, Reginald Brade an assistant secretary from the War Office (later Sir Reginald and 
permanent secretary from 1914 onwards), Edmund Robbins of the Press Association as the 
committee secretary, and representatives of the Newspaper Society, the Newspaper 
Proprietors Association, the Irish Newspaper Society, the Federation of Northern Newspaper 
Owners, and the Federation of Southern Newspaper Owners; military and naval officers 
sometimes attended, including Brigadier-General Henry Wilson as Director of Military 
Operations. The chief function of this committee was to provide government advice and 
guidance to newspapers regarding what might constitute a security risk.  
The Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee was chiefly concerned with higher 
policy, and with how newspapers rather than reporters might act. The role of individual 
reporters if the BEF was mobilised for war was within the remit of the War Office. In this 
case also, before 1914 largely informal or negotiated peacetime understandings prevailed, 
together with some practices established in the Anglo-Boer War, and the continuing 1889 
agreement on accreditation of newspaper correspondents. Prior to the war, Henry Wilson’s 
Directorate of Military Operations already contained a small staff group designated MO5(h) 
which was responsible for overseeing military press and postal functions. Charles Callwell, 
who had been Assistant Director of Military Operations 1904-7, had retired as a colonel in 
1909, and was himself a notable military writer, described in his post-war memoirs the 
existence in 1914 of a small War Office staff grouping (presumably meaning MO5(h) or part 
of it) established in 1911 or 1912, with its own transport and clerks, to function as the press 
escort and liaison for the BEF in the event of mobilisation, and headed by Major A.G. Stuart, 
who ‘had been in control of the Press representatives’ in the 1912 Army manoeuvres and the 
smaller 1913 Army manoeuvres, both of which were accompanied by a sizeable number of 
reporters.
6
                  
It is quite certain that the events that would lead to the publication of the Amiens 
Dispatch were not planned or initiated by any official British propaganda organisations, for 
3 
 
the simple reason that no such organisations existed at the time. The first government 
institution dedicated to wartime propaganda, which was based at Wellington House in 
London, was only established in the week beginning Sunday 30 August 1914, the day that the 
Amiens Dispatch was published.
7
 But in a manner entirely characteristic of British 
propaganda organisation, although Wellington House came eventually to be designated as the 
War Propaganda Bureau, it continued to be known in official circles by its earlier name, and 
to do much of its work through informal or semi-official contacts. Indeed, the key to much of 
British propaganda was the very close informal contacts that existed between members of the 
government, the civil service and armed forces, and the owners or editors of important 
newspapers, along with other leading figures in society. This included pre-war ‘gentlemen’s 
agreements’ that were to be severely tested by the pressures of the July-August 1914 war 
crisis. On Monday 27 July, the day after the Serbian reply to Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum, 
the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee held a quick meeting at the Admiralty, at 
which one member, Sir George Riddell as chairman of the Newspaper Proprietors 
Association, complained that ‘it was very easy to make agreements in time of peace, but 
when the emergency arrives and the public is avid for news, the situation was difficult’.
8
 The 
result of this meeting was a secret communiqué issued by the committee next day, drafted 
according to Riddell by himself and Edmund Robbins as committee secretary, addressed to 
all British newspaper editors and asking them not to report the movements of British 
warships, troops or aircraft. At a further meeting on Thursday 30 July the committee noted 
that The Times had referred to one small naval movement, and that the newspapers were 
pressuring the Admiralty and War Office with enquiries. But other than these kinds of minor 
slips and leaks, the communiqué’s request was very largely honoured, and in the following 
weeks British newspapers maintained silence about the BEF as it mobilised and deployed to 
France. Only on Tuesday 18 August, the day after the BEF’s deployment was completed, did 
the British press announce that it had crossed to France. 
The Thursday 30 July meeting of the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee 
also discussed the matter of war correspondents being sent with the BEF if it should deploy 
overseas. Robbins as secretary suggested that the War Office should form a small committee 
with the press to discuss this; Riddell added that they should call for newspapers to provide a 
register of correspondents to be given accreditation; and Reginald Brade for the War Office 
pointed out that no decision had yet been taken on sending the BEF (in fact a cabinet decision 
on the previous day had been not to send it, as no war had yet been declared); after this 
discussion it was resolved ‘to leave the matter over for the present’.
9
 The committee did not 
meet again until 20 August, by which date both circumstances and its role had changed 
considerably with Britain’s entry into the war and the despatch of the BEF. This meeting on 
30 July showed clearly that both the War Office and the newspaper representatives expected 
accredited reporters to accompany the BEF if it were sent overseas, and that this would be a 
reasonably straightforward procedure, but that no practical decisions or detailed planning had 
taken place, contrary to the impression given in Callwell’s memoirs. 
The formal British declaration of war against Germany came into force at 11.00 p.m. 
on Tuesday 4 August, and the mobilisation of the BEF began next day. A severe problem for 
other major powers in the war crisis, notably for Germany and Austria-Hungary, may have 
been an excess of influence and authority by senior army officers. But for Great Britain the 
opposite was true, and the problems lay in military weakness and in a near power-vacuum in 
the military high command. Since the Curragh Mutiny (or Curragh Incident) of April 1914, 
the post of Secretary of State for War, the political head of the Army, had been vacant with 
Asquith notionally carrying out the role himself. Field Marshal Sir John French had also 
resigned as Chief of the Imperial General Staff over the Curragh, the professional head of the 
Amy, being replaced by the lesser and politically inexperienced figure of General Sir Charles 
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Douglas. French remained through summer 1914 in a kind of military limbo; he had for some 
years been the designated Commander-in-Chief of the BEF if it was mobilised, but it was far 
from clear in the July-August crisis that he would automatically be given the post. Kitchener 
had arrived in Britain from Egypt on Tuesday 23 June to receive his earldom from King 
George V, and it was largely by accident that he was available to be offered the War Office 
as a political appointment. Asquith’s decision to offer Kitchener the War Office, and his 
confirmation of French as commander of the BEF, were entirely politically based and took 
place in the context of considerable political and press lobbying. The most cynical view of 
Asquith’s offer to Kitchener was that Asquith wanted a scapegoat at the War Office in case of 
British defeat. As a less conspiratorial explanation, Asquith needed both men as famous 
military figures, to reassure his cabinet colleagues, so minimising resignations, and also to 
reassure the mass of the public.
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What is also clear, both from the two Councils of War held by Asquith on Wednesday 
5 and Thursday 6 August, and from the comments of several cabinet members at the time, is 
that in comparison to their knowledge of finance or domestic politics most of them had only 
the most general or vague understanding of the nature of the war on which they were 
embarking, or the strengths and weaknesses of the BEF. Recent historical research has 
identified many of these weaknesses, largely stemming from the small size of the BEF, at six 
infantry divisions and five cavalry brigades, and the Army’s efforts before the war to retain 
even this number by expedients and by duplicating positions and functions.
11
 The only 
formation within the BEF that was genuinely fully trained and ready for war was Aldershot 
Command under General Sir Douglas Haig, which formed I Corps on mobilisation, 
consisting of a higher headquarters who had trained together, two infantry divisions, and a 
cavalry brigade. Otherwise, much about the BEF was a matter of hurried improvisation. The 
BEF’s other four infantry divisions, making up II Corps and III Corps, were to varying 
degrees underequipped and more heavily dependent on reservists than Haig’s I Corps. 
French’s own headquarters staff was hurriedly improvised and changed as the BEF deployed, 
much to his frustration and annoyance. There were also no pre-war permanent headquarters 
for II Corps, III Corps or the Cavalry Division (comprising four of the cavalry brigades). 
Along with other training institutions, the Army Staff College at Camberley was closed down 
not (as some historians have suggested) from the conviction that this would be a short war 
with no need for further trained staff officers, but because its staff and instructors had crucial 
designated wartime roles.
12
 The Commandant at Camberley, Brigadier-General Lancelot 
Kiggell, moved on 5 August to become Director of Military Training at the War Office; 
Charles Callwell, also, was recalled from his retirement of five years to become Director of 
Military Operations at the War Office. The pre-war decision to free experienced staff officers 
familiar with the latest developments in the Army to take positions within the BEF on 
mobilisation, and to replace them at the War Office with others, caused considerable 
disruption within the War Office itself, even more so as this was combined with Kitchener’s 
unexpected appointment, and with Douglas as an inexperienced Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff who was not himself a qualified (psc) general staff officer.  
Both prior to Asquith’s two Councils of War and during them, French and Haig both 
floated the idea that the BEF’s departure should be delayed or its concentration area changed, 
which would have given more time for its training deficiencies to be made good and perhaps 
increased its strength. Despite this, once the decision was made that the BEF was to be sent at 
once, the only plan for which the transport and supply had been pre-organised in detail was 
that which was in fact implemented: a deployment to Maubeuge and advance into Belgium in 
support of the French Fifth Army. But there was also a genuine fear within the two Councils 
of War both of a surprise German raid across the English Channel, for which plans already 
existed to hold a division in reserve, and of possible riots if the British financial system 
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collapsed as a result of the war crisis. The decision that came from the second Council of 
War’s deliberations was that the BEF would at first deploy only four infantry divisions and 
its cavalry division, plus the extra cavalry brigade.
13
 The 4th Infantry Division under Major 
General Thomas D’O. Snow was held behind to reassure public opinion, deploying first to 
eastern England, and only starting to cross to France on the night of 22/23 August, about four 
days behind the main BEF. In consequence of this, the 4th Infantry Division did not arrive in 
time to take part in the Battle of Mons on Sunday 23 August. The 6th Infantry Division, the 
final infantry division of the BEF, made up of troops based in Ireland as well as Britain, did 
not cross to France until September. 
 On Friday 7 August, the day that his appointment as Secretary of State for War 
became official, Kitchener made his first public call for a mass volunteer army, starting with 
100,000 men. This appeared in newspapers in the form of an advertisement: ‘Your King and 
Country Need You / A Call To Arms / An addition of 100,000 men to His Majesty’s Regular 
Army is immediately necessary in the present grave National Emergency / Lord Kitchener is 
confident that this appeal will be at once responded to by all who have the safety of our 
Empire at heart’.
14
 Over the weekend, 8,193 men were attested; there were very few social 
groups who could volunteer immediately and in a carefree spirit: chiefly the unemployed 
from one end of the social scale and the financially self-sufficient from the other, together 
with anyone without personal or professional commitments to leave behind; there was no 
immediate ‘rush to the colours’ on the outbreak of war. Kitchener’s cabinet colleagues seem 
to have been largely bemused by his call for volunteers, some considering it as only a 
convenient way of absorbing the surplus unemployed in the workforce.
15
 But there was a 
precedent, well known to Kitchener for those who cared to notice, in the rush of British 
volunteers for the Anglo-Boer War, not so much on its outbreak in October 1899 as two 
months later in response to the triple British defeats of ‘Black Week’, a response that 
produced over 100,000 British volunteers in the course of that war (plus nearly half as many 
again who failed the Army medical test).
16
  
Despite his well-known public contempt for the press, Kitchener also knew from his 
considerable previous experiences how to exploit it. A few days after his appointment, 
Kitchener gave an interview to Colonel Charles à Court Repington, the military 
correspondent of The Times, at the London home of Lady Wantage in Carleton Gardens.
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The old cliché that in August 1914 the war was generally expected in Britain to be over by 
Christmas has been convincingly overturned by historians, and the long article by Repington 
that appeared in The Times for Saturday 15 August is important evidence of Kitchener’s own 
views on this. The article explained that the call was now for up to 500,000 volunteers, based 
on Britain expecting to fight a war that ‘may be long, very long’ and stressed the size and 
power of Germany and its military forces. The article also made reference to ‘The Policy of 
Pit’ meaning Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger’s strategy in the war against 
Napoleon, suggesting a chiefly naval war with further trained British troops being deployed 
to the continent at some time in the future, in support of the BEF. The article stated 
Kitchener’s intention that for ‘the Regular Army little or nothing will be changed,’ and 
described his plan (which was later overtaken by events) to divide the Territorial Force into 
two categories, those willing to serve overseas and those only volunteering for home defence. 
Also, the article continued, ‘on this occasion, when public spirit is high and so many hands 
are thrown out of work by the war, there has been a rush to join, and in a week or a fortnight 
the first 100,000 will be made up’ to join what Repington called the New Army, with 
Kitchener’s estimate that ‘the new army may possibly be nearly ready for the field in six 
months’; enough in itself to disprove the ‘over by Christmas’ story.
18
  
The impact of this Times article made Repington’s prediction self-fulfilling, and by 
next Saturday 22 August (the day before the Battle of Mons), 101,939 men had put 
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themselves forward as volunteers. This was between twice and three times as many men as 
the Army normally had volunteer in a year in peacetime, and already enough to overwhelm 
the War Office’s ability to cope with the probable influx. Obviously, not every volunteer’s 
actions may be attributed solely to Kitchener’s call through Repington and The Times. As 
recent historians’ research has shown, recruiting was at first patchy across the country and 
across social groups; and the relatively low figures from most rural areas in August may 
simply have reflected the need to gather the harvest. But at least part of the foundation of the 
belief that the men had all volunteered swiftly and in high spirits was a direct product of 
Kitchener’s need to stimulate recruitment, and Repington’s obliging propaganda. If there can 
be said to be a typical response from the British population, it was shock at the news of war, a 
growing sense of concern at their country in danger, a desire to balance any willingness to 
volunteer against existing commitments to jobs and families, and in a society that was highly 
socially structured and deferential waiting for a lead from their national and local leaders, 
which was first provided by Kitchener’s Times interview.
19
 Repington later claimed that 
Kitchener told him that they could have no more direct contact, since he was under pressure 
through his cabinet colleagues from other newspaper editors, furious that he had given The 
Times such an exclusive.
20
 
To continue the story it is necessary to return to Monday 27 July and the meeting of 
the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee, where the press agreed to voluntarily 
submit to restriction of the news in the event of British involvement in the war. With war 
declared, on Wednesday 5 August, immediately after his appointment as Secretary of State 
for War, Kitchener together with Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty asked the 
prominent Conservative member of parliament F.E. Smith to create and head a new wartime 
Press Bureau, to act as a mouthpiece for all War Office, Admiralty, and other government 
department statements relating to the war, and as a point of contact for the press to submit 
pieces for censorship. F.E. Smith was an astute and experienced politician, and was not only 
a friend of Churchill’s, but even an officer in the same Territorial mounted regiment, the 
Queen’s Own Oxfordshire Hussars, meaning that he could take up his post immediately with 
the acting rank of full colonel. Despite the pre-war plans, the role of the Press Office was not 
well understood or agreed at first. The editor of the Manchester Guardian C.P. Scott 
described Smith ‘as press-correspondent in intimate association with the Admiralty and War 
Office’, and his appointment as a minor example of Asquith already creating a coalition 
government rather than a truly Liberal one.
21
 Asquith’s wife Margot recorded her own 
understanding of how her husband described this: ‘We’ve had a Press Committee, which we 
have also decided to have at Committee of [Imperial] Defence, to which papers can send a 
delegate; and we tell them what they may not publish’.
22
 ‘Taffy’ Gwynn, now editor of the 
Conservative London daily Morning Post, who generally approved of all things military, 
noted that ‘The secrecy is tremendous and quite right’.
23
 Although increasingly frustrated, 
newspapers and their owners largely remained sympathetic to the need for security, at least 
for the first four or five weeks of the war.       
The first communiqué from the Press Bureau appeared on Tuesday 11 August, the day 
that the first troops of the BEF crossed to France, although the British press continued to 
observe silence on this matter.
24
 No accredited reporters crossed with the BEF, and for a little 
over a week the London press was in a state of confusion as to how to respond to the War 
Office’s behaviour. William Beach-Thomas of the Daily Mail, who in 1915 became an 
official war correspondent with the BEF, claimed in his memoirs that his newspaper had no 
designated war correspondent in August 1914, that the proprietor Lord Northcliffe (who also 
owned The Times) picked the sporting editor as suitable, that the War Office then told the 
man to buy a horse, and that he and other correspondents-in-waiting were seen for a few days 
exercising their horses in Hyde Park.
25
 However, no permission to join the BEF as accredited 
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reporters was forthcoming; instead the newspapers’ enquiries were met with various 
responses, the burden of which was that the BEF was moving within a media cordon 
sanitaire, a notional cocoon or bubble surrounding the troops within which any reporters 
were liable to arrest. Both at the time and ever since, this has been seen as a deliberate policy 
laid down by Kitchener. Despite the absence of firm evidence, there seems no reason to doubt 
that Kitchener’s attitude played a very large part in it; but account needs also to be taken of 
the chaotic state of the War Office at the time, its many higher priorities than worrying about 
the press, and the unfamiliarity of some of its officers with the agreements that the press 
believed were already in place from before the war.  
The response of the London newspapers and their correspondents to their neglect by 
the War Office (to use no stronger term) has many parallels in the history of war reporting: 
they went off to war regardless. Despite the self-censorship of the British press, the BEF’s 
crossing to France and deployment had been freely reported in foreign newspapers, and its 
general location on the French-Belgian border was known. Some British reporters were 
already in France or in Belgium, others now journeyed to Paris or attached themselves to the 
French and Belgian armies; most began to pursue the BEF and a story, taking the prospect of 
temporary military arrest as part of the game. How close most of them came to the fighting in 
August is hard to determine, including from their own later accounts. Philip Gibbs of the 
Daily Chronicle claimed in his memoirs that with two other reporters he had interviewed 
British soldiers retreating from Mons on about the day after the battle; but this account is 
unsubstantiated and has some discrepancies, and it is likely that the first British reporters 
arrived with the BEF a few days later, just after the Battle of Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 
August.
26
    
The two weeks following the BEF’s concentration at Maubeuge on Thursday 20 
August and advance into Belgium remained a period of uncertainty for the British public, but 
there was by no means a complete press blackout. While information reaching even Prime 
Minister Asquith and his colleagues was limited and uncertain, there were straws in the wind, 
and astute politicians could see which way that wind was blowing. On the day after Mons, 
Monday 24 August, Asquith wrote to his (probably platonic) mistress Venetia Stanley, ‘The 
last thing French said to me when we took farewell in this room, was that we must be 
prepared for a reverse or two at first. And you know how disgusted I have been with the silly 
optimism of our press’.
27
 Late on the same day the Press Bureau released a short 
communiqué, ‘The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark with the 
enemy at Mons, and held their ground’; this was picked up next day by most newspapers, 
together with a second communiqué to the effect that the British had moved to new positions, 
and were being opposed by approximately equal numbers of Germans; The Times, although 
retaining a positive tone when describing the British withdrawal, assessed that across the 
front ‘The battle is joined and so far has gone ill for the Allies’.
28
 Also on Tuesday 25 August 
the British government published The Belgian Official Report, giving the first account by the 
Belgian government of German war crimes and attacks on civilians during their invasion of 
Belgium.
29
 On the same day 10,019 men around the country volunteered for the Army, the 
first occasion on which the daily number had reached five figures. Two days later on 
Thursday 27 August a preliminary meeting took place in the House of Commons, followed 
by two more meetings in over the next three days, that laid the foundations of the 
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, a cross-party committee to co-ordinate the efforts of 
local recruiting committees and to start to bring order to volunteering process.
30
   
As is well known, after fighting the Battle of Mons the BEF became divided at the 
start of its retreat, leading to its II Corps (3rd and 5th Infantry Divisions) having to stand and 
fight at the Battle of Le Cateau on Wednesday 26 August. Most of the fighting troops of 
Major General Snow’s 4th Infantry arrived at Le Cateau by train on Monday 24 August, 
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began advancing towards the rest of the BEF next day, and then fell back again to Le Cateau 
as part of the general retreat, taking up its position with II Corps as part of the British 
defensive line. Snow’s division had suffered from peacetime inadequacies and from its 
rushed deployment across the English Channel. It fought the Battle of Le Cateau without its 
divisional heavy artillery, its engineers, its supply train and ammunition column, its field 
ambulances (medical services), most of its signallers, and its divisional cavalry, who were 
used for scouting and to give early warning of danger. The division had even deployed 
without its field cookers, standard equipment used to provide hot meals in the field, and the 
troops were hungry as well as cold and wet by night, and then hot and thirsty by day from 
marching under the August sun.
31
  
The German advance was stopped dead by the British stand at Le Cateau, quite 
literally in many cases. Having taken the heaviest casualties of any British division in battle 
so far, 3,158 men (excluding a large number of stragglers who later returned to their units), 
4th Infantry Division retreated off the battlefield in the late afternoon, as part of the general 
British plan to halt the Germans, break contact, and resume the retreat. But the sight of the 
British soldiers walking away in groups struck some observers as resembling a disorganised 
mob. Colonel Victor Huguet, the French liaison officer with BEF headquarters, reported next 
day that ‘conditions are such that for the moment the British army no longer exists’.
32
 There 
was virtually no effective German pursuit, but retreating in forced marches through the 
August heat, soldiers hallucinated from lack of sleep and dehydration, seeing phantom castles 
and friendly riders nearby. Commanders feared that if their men were allowed to rest they 
would never get them up again. Some formations of the 4th Infantry Division became lost 
from the main body for several days. On the day after Le Cateau, BEF headquarters issued 
orders for its retreating formations to abandon all unnecessary equipment and use the 
transport to carry their exhausted men; this was misinterpreted by 4th Infantry Division as an 
order to destroy all equipment as part of a sauve qui peut or general flight, and much 
equipment was burned before the order could be countermanded.
33
 On the same day, two of 
4th Infantry Division’s battalion commanders, who were later court-martialled, attempted to 
surrender their battalions together with the town of Saint Quentin, and were only prevented 
by the intervention of British cavalry.
34
  
This was the situation when, on Thursday 27 and Friday 28 August, two British 
reporters, Hamilton Fyfe of the Daily Mail (who rather than riding a horse drove a Rolls-
Royce) and Arthur Moore of The Times, came across retreating soldiers of 4th Infantry 
Division, mostly scattered and trying to find their parent units, but evidently prepared to talk 
to reporters. The story of what happened next was set out in some detail in the official history 
of The Times in 1952, complete with facsimile reproductions of the critical documents, and is 
generally supported by other accounts and sources, although there are some difficulties with 
it that may never be resolved.
35
 Back at their hotel at Amiens on the morning of Saturday 29 
August, Moore and Fyfe each wrote out his story, and these were sent back together to their 
respective newspapers. As was common among journalists, Moore’s handwritten dispatch 
was composed as if he had written it on Saturday afternoon or evening, which is when he 
knew it would arrive at The Times’s headquarters at Printing House Square in London. 
Caught up in the drama of events, and drawing on what he had heard from lost, exhausted 
and in some cases traumatised soldiers, Moore identified the men that he had interviewed as 
from ‘the Fourth Division, all that was left of 20,000 fine troops’ and that it had been ‘thrown 
into the fight at the end of a long march and had not even the time to dig trenches’. Pleading 
at the start of his article to the censor to allow its story to be told, Moore painted a vivid 
word-picture of ‘straggling units,’ of almost continuous ‘desperate fighting’ from Mons 
onwards, and of the Germans daily harassing the retreating British with ‘Aeroplanes, 
Zeppelins, armoured motors and cavalry’. In fact the first Zeppelin airship raid took place on 
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the night of 5/6 August on Liege, and the German did have some armoured cars, but none 
were used against the British in the retreat from Mons. ‘I have seen broken bits of many 
regiments’, Moore continued, and men ‘worn out with marching’ who were nevertheless 
‘steady and cheerful, and wherever they arrive make straight for the proper authorities and 
seek news of their regiment’.
36
  
At Printing House Square, after reading through this dramatic document, which was 
about two newspaper columns long, The Times’s acting editor George Freeman, together with 
foreign correspondent Henry Wickham Steed, blue-pencilled those parts of Moore’s account 
which they believed would not survive censorship, and sent the manuscript to the Press 
Bureau. Significantly for the importance that German war crimes and atrocities were soon to 
have in British propaganda and recruiting, a paragraph on German atrocities in Belgium was 
deleted from the version sent to the censor, for reasons of space. After about two to three 
hours, shortly before midnight, the piece was returned with a note from F.E. Smith himself, 
actually re-instating several of the self-censored passages, and adding a concluding 
paragraph, written as a continuation of Moore’s account and as if the author had been a 
witness to the events, ‘The British Expeditionary Force, which bore the great weight of the 
[German] blow, has suffered terrible losses’ but ‘it needs men, men, and yet more men,’ and 
that ‘We want reinforcements and we want them now’. Even the identification of the 4th 
Infantry Division was not censored out, a breach of what would later become established 
practice. Smith also added a covering note, ‘I am sorry to have censored this most able and 
interesting message so freely but the reasons are obvious. Forgive my clumsy journalistic 
suggestions but I beg you to use the parts of this article which I have passed to enforce the 
lesson – re-inforcements and re-inforcements at once’.
37
 Interpreting Smith’s ‘suggestions’ as 
a command, The Times made the unprecedented decision to run Moore’s piece on the front 
page of a special edition on Sunday 30 August, by-lined ‘from our ‘from our special 
correspondent’ and with the dateline ‘Amiens August 29’; hence ‘Amiens Dispatch’. 
Normally The Times ran only advertisements and personal messages on its front page, and 
was not published on Sundays (The Sunday Times appeared in the ordinary way on the same 
day leading with other stories). The headlines for Moore’s story ran ‘Mons and Cambrai / 
Losses of the British Army / Fight Against Severe Odds / Need for Reinforcements’. The rest 
of the front page included more general stories about the war in the west and the east, and the 
naval war. Some editions appear also have included material from Fyfe’s piece, copied 
directly from another of Northcliffe’s papers, the Sunday morning Weekly Dispatch, which 
was a sister paper to the Daily Mail.
38
 The next day, Monday 31 August, over 30,000 men 
volunteered to join the Army.  
What the public, and presumably The Times’s staff, could not know was that the 
publication of the Amiens Dispatch coincided with a crisis in Asquith’s government over 
communications between Kitchener at the War Office and Sir John French at BEF 
headquarters. Over the weekend Herbert and Margot Asquith were away from London 
visiting members of her family at her niece’s home in Lymphe, Kent, and later some 
wounded soldiers at Folkstone Hospital.
39
 But on the Monday Asquith and his colleagues 
found themselves puzzling over a long and rambling telegram sent from Sir John French to 
the War Office, full of ambiguities, which called for a general attack while simultaneously 
appearing to demand that the BEF must be pulled out of the line. Asquith had already been 
facing with annoyance the prospect of complaints in the House of Commons over the 
decision to suspend the Government of Ireland Act. Now he also found himself facing 
criticisms and demands for information following the special edition of The Times with the 
Amiens Dispatch. He complained to Venetia Stanley that ‘The Times published a most 
wicked telegram on Sunday from a supposed correspondent at Amiens, describing the rout 
and desperation of our army,’ although the report had denied that there had been any rout; 
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Margot Asquith, wrongly attributing the decision to publish to Geoffrey Dawson, The 
Times’s editor, complained to Andrew Bonar Law of the way that ‘The article about our 
failures, which he published in Sunday’s Times ([30] August 1914) was translated into every 
language and widely circulated’. 
40
 ‘Taffy’ Gwynne of the Morning Post was furious at what 
he saw as a security breach by The Times, writing angry letters to Asquith and to others 
(including Charles Masterman, who had just been asked to set up Wellington House), as well 
as denouncing The Times in his editorials, to the point at which Dawson asked for a meeting 
with Gwynn on ‘neutral ground’.
41
 
 The popular response to the Amiens Dispatch reproduced, on a vastly larger scale, the 
volunteerism following the defeats of Black Week in the Anglo-Boer War, in reaction to 
what was portrayed as a defeat and a national crisis rather than a mood of exuberance. Over 
the following week up to Monday 7 September, 174,901 volunteers came forward, by far the 
largest single number for any week of the war, causing the Army recruiting system to 
collapse by mid-week, with men’s names being taken before they were sent home again 
because the Army could not process them. This was a formidable piece of recruiting 
propaganda. But there is good evidence that in passing the Amiens Dispatch and adding his 
own call for recruits, F.E. Smith (who was, after all, an opposition Conservative member of 
parliament) had acted without reference to the government, which did not welcome his 
actions. Following the publication of the special edition of The Times on the Sunday morning, 
at 3.40 pm the War Office issued through the Press Bureau a communiqué (which according 
to Asquith was written by Churchill) describing in measured tones the events from Mons to 
Le Cateau as a ‘four days battle’ but adding that since Thursday 26 August the BEF had been 
unmolested except by German cavalry patrols, and had received twice the number of 
reinforcements as its losses, ending that ‘the army is ready for the next encounter, undaunted 
in spirit’.
42
 This was followed by a statement from the Press Bureau at 11.10 pm, that though 
it did not forbid publication of reports from the war zone, such stories ‘should be received 
with extreme caution. No correspondents are at the front, and their information, however 
honestly sent, is therefore derived at second or third hand from persons who are often in no 
position to tell coherent stories’.
43
  
These Press Bureau correctives appeared in London newspapers on Monday, 
simultaneously with questions being asked about the Amiens Dispatch in the House of 
Commons first to Asquith, and then in the evening to F.E. Smith. Asquith began by 
describing the publication as a ‘very regrettable exception’ to the patriotic restraint shown by 
the press, and announced that the government had that very day made new arrangements for 
providing the public with information about the BEF; what these arrangements were would 
become apparent a week later.
44
 In response to Asquith’s criticisms, The Times sent a 
statement to the House of Commons which was read into the parliamentary record, and next 
day, Tuesday 1 September, it published additional statements on the circumstances, pointing 
out that ‘we published it in accordance with the official request’, although certainly neither 
Smith nor anyone in government had called for a special Sunday edition to be created for the 
purpose.
45
 Smith spoke for about an hour, starting by claiming that ‘I never sought the office 
that I hold,’ and embarking on a history of government-press relations up to that date, starting 
with the Admiralty, War Office and Press Committee. When he eventually reached the 
circumstances of the Amiens Dispatch, he pointed out that ‘no war correspondents were 
being allowed at the front, and that there was the greatest anxiety, and legitimate anxiety, to 
obtain any information as to the fortunes of the campaign’, that being passed by the censor 
did not actually mean government endorsement of the report, and that his addition of a call 
for reinforcements ‘was in order to carry out what I knew to be the policy of the War 
Office’.
46
 Smith was to resign at his own request from heading the Press Bureau before the 
end of September. The entire sequence of events leading both to and from the Amiens 
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Dispatch arose from confusion within the government over propaganda, and from the lack of 
a system that had been agreed and understood by the press itself of accreditation for reporters, 
and of press handling and censorship.  
But this is not quite the end of the story. In the heightened atmosphere of Monday 31 
August, a second telegram was received by Kitchener from Sir John French at BEF 
headquarters just before midnight, which was interpreted as evidence of panic in BEF 
headquarters, an assessment which is contradicted by the evidence of junior officers who 
noted French’s calmness and confidence that day. Of several possible explanations, the most 
plausible is that French, who was a poor prose stylist, had composed the telegrams himself 
rather than entrust them to a staff officer. Asquith’s response, as he described it to Venetia 
Stanley, was to send Kitchener out to France ‘to unravel the situation and if necessary put the 
fear of God in them all’.
47
 Kitchener and French met on Tuesday 1 September; exactly what 
they said to each other is unknown: Kitchener never spoke of the meeting and French’s 
memoirs are unreliable. But the result was a formal order (or ‘instruction’ to use the official 
term) from Kitchener to French that the BEF would cease its retreat and turn to take part in 
the Battle of the Marne, the decisive French Army counterstroke that ended the German 
threat to win the war quickly. But by remaining in action the BEF also lost in total 31,709 
casualties up to 4 October, destroying a large part of the stock of experienced officers that 
might have commanded the new armies that Kitchener was raising.  While obviously the 
Amiens Dispatch was not the chief factor in this sequence of events, it was an important 
addition to the general atmosphere of stress and crisis within which Asquith’s and 
Kitchener’s decisions were made.  
Also on Monday 31 August, at its third meeting in the House of Commons, the 
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee was officially created. Soon famous for its recruiting 
posters, the main function of this committee was not at first to promote recruiting, but to seek 
to bring to it some kind of order by encouraging and supporting local recruiting committees. 
While the official and central recruiting system was temporarily in a state of collapse, local 
recruiters who believed that they had been given a clear lead, as well as a call for more 
recruits through the press, temporarily took over the process. It was late September 1914 that 
saw the great eruption of local and regional recruiting which led to the famous Pals 
Battalions, infantry units recruited locally, often from friends and workmates. At their high 
point in October 1914, 84 new battalions were raised locally, compared with 19 raised 
through the official War Office machinery.
48
 Finally, on Monday 7 September, the peak of 
recruiting stimulated by the Amiens Dispatch, the change to government policy on reporters 
with the BEF announced by Asquith a week earlier came into force. While the details of how 
the decision was made remain unknown, Kitchener had taken his old idea from the Anglo-
Boer War even further, by appointing a serving officer who was also an experienced writer, 
Colonel Ernest Swinton, to BEF headquarters to write under the by-line ‘Eyewitness,’ as the 
sole British official reporter on the Western Front.
49
 This arrangement, which pleased no-one, 
lasted until spring 1915, when Swinton was at first joined and then replaced by accredited 
newspaper reporters with BEF headquarters.  
Although, as has been repeatedly stressed, the Amiens Dispatch was not the sole 
cause of any major subsequent event, without its publication the British news blackout on the 
Western Front might have continued for much longer than it did. Also and more 
speculatively, the BEF might not have fought in the Battle of the Marne; and the Pals 
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